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This paper investigates the determinants of longevity at a macroeconomic level, emphasiz-
ing the important role played by education. To analyze the determinants of longevity, we build
a model where households intentionally invest in health and education, and where education
exerts external eﬀects on longevity. Performing an empirical analysis using data across 71
countries, we ﬁnd that society’s tertiary education attainment rate is important for longevity,
in addition to any role that basic education plays for life expectancy at the individual level.
This ﬁnding uncovers a key externality of education, consistent with the theoretical hypothesis
advanced in our macroeconomic model.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
To the extent that income is not the sole determinant of health status across the world, one can
view health as a separate component of welfare, other than income. In this case, the factors driving
welfare growth might well be diﬀerent than those relevant for economic growth, with important
policy implications.1 Thus, a central question in the debate on the determinants of international
health outcomes asks whether these are a mere by-product of economic growth (see Pritchett and
Summers, 1996) or whether ‘exogenous’ non-income sources are largely responsible, as argued by
Preston (1975, 1980, 1996).
In line with the latter, Becker, Philipson and Soares (2005), Soares (2007a, 2007b), Cutler,
Deaton and Lleras-Muney (2006), and Papageorgiou, Savvides, and Zachariadis (2007) argue that
improvements in life expectancy have largely occurred independently of per capita income growth
and are related to new medical technology and to the accumulation and diﬀusion of health knowl-
edge. Soares (2007a, p.35) emphasizes the role of education pointing out that “[t]echnologies
related to individual-level inputs used in the production of health seem to be subject to the ef-
fectiveness with which individuals can use these inputs” so that “more educated individuals have
higher survival advantage in diseases for which medical progress has been important.” Similarly,
Cutler, Deaton and Lleras-Muney (2006, p. 115) write that “the diﬀerential use of health knowl-
edge and technology [is] almost certainly [an] important part of the explanation” as to why “[t]here
is most likely a direct positive eﬀect of education on health.” As long as there exist cross-country
diﬀerences in educational attainment rates, we would expect diﬀerences in international health
outcomes.
This paper examines the determinants of cross-country health outcomes with emphasis on the
mechanisms through which education impacts upon longevity. We attempt to understand the
role played by diﬀerent factors in determining life expectancy. These include private purchases of
medical inputs and publicly provided health inputs aﬀecting the environment in which households
live and make decisions. The eﬃciency of these inputs in aﬀecting longevity depends on how well
health-related knowledge is exploited in society. For the individual, own or parental education is
crucial in facilitating access to and understanding of health-related information. The availability of
health-related knowledge in the ﬁrst place depends on the overall level of education in the country.
Education can therefore play two direct roles in the determination of health outcomes. First,
the level of education within the household enhances the longevity of its members. For example,
education aﬀects crucial factors such as understanding treatments, assessing risks incurred with
1Conversely, if growth in real income per capita alone determined improvements in health status, then there
would be no scope in studying health status and welfare growth as concepts distinct from economic growth.Longevity and Education: A Macroeconomic Perspective 2
hazardous behavior, or feeding children healthily. Second, the aggregate level of education in the
economy improves the quality of health services oﬀered within a country. One reason for this would
be that the average level of education improves a country’s absorptive capacity for health-related
technology and ideas. Another related reason is that we would expect physicians to be more likely
to implement new treatments to the general population in countries where the average patient is
more educated.2
The two direct eﬀects of education play conceptually diﬀerent roles. The ﬁrst one operates
as a rival input beneﬁting household members. We expect this role of education in enhancing a
household’s longevity to exhibit diminishing returns3 so that primary education attainment levels
should suﬃce to capture it. The second eﬀect depends on the ability and readiness of the health
sector to take advantage of best practices. This is a high-tech sector experiencing fast technological
progress. Furthermore, eﬃcient use of new medical technologies requires understanding of scientiﬁc
ﬁndings. The sophisticated character of knowledge transmission and use in this sector suggests
higher education constitutes its crucial determinant. That higher education attainment constitutes
a small percentage of the population during the period under study, suggests that the presence
of a large eﬀect of higher education could not be explained with a mechanism that operates just
within the household4, but should largely be due to externalities. Controlling for basic education,
any additional eﬀects from higher education would then be consistent with this second external
role of education.
We build a theoretical model to analyze the relationship between life expectancy, educational
decisions, private and public investment in health, and income. In our model, individuals inten-
tionally spend resources to enhance their life expectancy similar to Chakraborty and Das (2005).
The eﬀective discount rate is therefore endogenous: by investing in health the individual chooses
to become less impatient. Performing comparative statics in the case of an interior solution to the
individual problem, we ﬁnd that private health investment -hence life expectancy- and education
are positively correlated. A bidirectional causal relationship between education and longevity ex-
2Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2006) argue in page 16 that “[t]he more educated ... appear to make use of new
health related information ﬁrst” and “are more likely to trust science”, so that we would expect health specialists
to be more willing to learn about, explain, and implement new treatments to educated patients more receptive to
new medical knowledge. Physicians practicing in regions with greater education levels for the average patient would
then be more likely to implement new treatments to the general population of the region.
3This is consistent with evidence provided in Haines and Avery (1982) and Merrick (1985) using individual-level
d a t af r o mC o s t aR i c aa n dB r a z i lr e s p e c t i v e l y .T h e s ep a p e r sﬁnd female education to exhibit diminishing returns in
enhancing family health output. In particular, Haines and Avery (1982, p. 43) ﬁnd that “the results indicate a much
greater elasticity of response of child mortality to an additional year of education for women with less education than
with more education (11 percent against 2 percent)”, and Merrick (1985, p.6) ﬁnds that although mortality ratios
fall with education attainment, “the most striking diﬀerence in mortality ratios, however, is the contrast between
mothers with no formal education and other groups.” In fact, Merrick (1985, p.10) suggests the role of education
“may be limited to such basic steps as boiling contaminated water.”
4Unless one additional year of higher education attainment added an unrealistically large number of years to an
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ists at the individual level: while improved life expectancy raises the return on education inducing
more of it, greater investment in education increases expected future labor earnings and hence
incentives to keep oneself in good health.
We then study the stationary symmetric equilibrium introducing two direct5 roles played by
education in determining longevity. It is assumed that longevity is an increasing function of basic
education supplied by parents to children and of the average level of human capital in society (i.e.
higher education). For the ﬁrst feature, the distinction of two forms of education is meaningful
to highlight the possibility of a diﬀerential role played by education in determining longevity, as
argued above and as advanced in our empirical analysis. Soares (2005) and Cervellati and Sunde
(2007) also consider distinct roles of basic and higher education. As far as the second feature is
concerned, by allowing for an external eﬀect of the average level of education on the eﬃciency of
the health sector we magnify the feedback from education to longevity at the macroeconomic level
(see Blackburn and Cipriani, 2002).
To the best of our knowledge this is the ﬁrst model that brings together private intentional
investment in health and externalities from education on longevity in a uniﬁed framework.6 This
original model allows us to identify four links between education and longevity, with three of them
characterized by causality running from education to life expectancy. The presence of the aggregate
externality could potentially give rise to multiple equilibria (see Van Zon and Muysken, 2001). In
order to predict correlations between observable variables under our hypothesis on the causation
from education on longevity, we study the case with a unique interior equilibrium which prevails
for relatively small external eﬀects of education on life expectancy. We ﬁnd that higher and basic
education, private health investment and life expectancy are positively related, increasing with
public health investment, per capita income and the eﬃciency of the educational system.
Next, we use data from 71 countries to test the empirical plausibility of the supposed direct
roles played by education in determining longevity. Using initial period averages to explain end-
period life expectancy and utilizing appropriate instrumental variables estimates, allows us to
alleviate the endogeneity problem concerning longevity and education. To further address problems
5Compared to an indirect eﬀect of education on longevity running through permanent income, identiﬁed in the
case of the individual problem.
6Assuming existence of this type of externality is a common method to endogenize longevity: Life expectancy
is assumed to be positively aﬀected by the average or total stock of human capital in the economy (Blackburn and
Cipriani, 2002, Boucekkine et al., 2002, Lagerlöf, 2003, Chakraborty, 2004, Cervellati and Sunde, 2005), by per capita
national income (Kalemli-Ozcan, 2002), or by the public provision of private health services (van Zon and Muysken,
2001, Blackburn and Cipriani, 2002, Chakraborty, 2004). Only a handful of papers consider intentional investment
in health services to improve life expectancy: Blackburn and Cipriani (1998) who assume that the eﬃciency of
health investment is decreasing in the stock of capital, Sanso and Aísa (2006) who consider age-dependant eﬃciency
of health services, Van Zon and Muysken (2001) who restrict the analysis to the steady state solution of the social
planner problem, and Galor and Moav (2005) where there is no educational choice. None of these papers considers
the externality and intentional private health investment simultaneously, as we do here.Longevity and Education: A Macroeconomic Perspective 4
with capturing the direction of causality, we consider beginning of period changes in explanatory
variables to explain end of period changes in life expectancy. Controlling for the eﬀect of income,
health spending and other health inputs, we ﬁnd that tertiary education is no less important than
primary education for longevity. This suggests that the aggregate externality role of education is
at least as important as the role of basic education enhancing health outcomes at the household
level. Evidence of a form of increasing returns in education is particularly interesting, as previous
work has established that tertiary education has little explanatory power for per capita income
growth while primary education is its single most important determinant. Here, tertiary education
is shown to be important for another component of welfare.
The next section presents the model and theoretical results. Data are described and discussed
in section 3. Section 4 describes the empirical analysis and results, while section 5 concludes.
2 Am o d e lo fe d u c a t i o na n dh e a l t hi n v e s t m e n t
In this section, we present a model where education and health investment are chosen by individu-
als, and where education can exert external eﬀects on the productivity of health investment. This
framework is used to analyze the relationship between educational choices, purchases of health-
related services, provision of public health services, income, and life expectancy. First, we set up
the model with emphasis on the individual problem. We establish suﬃcient conditions for the
existence of a unique interior solution to the individual problem. This solution is used to predict
how changes in parameters induce adjustments in higher and basic education, as well as in health
investment and thus in longevity. Next, we turn to the stationary symmetric equilibrium with
externalities from education on life expectancy. We derive suﬃcient conditions for the existence of
a unique equilibrium and use the latter to predict comovements of variables of interest.
The model shows that education and longevity are strongly and positively related to each other.
Their relationship is mutually reinforcing and hinges on causation running in two directions: on
the one hand, improved life expectancy increases the return on education, inducing more of it;
on the other hand, more education implies longer life expectancy. In the model, the latter eﬀect
runs through three channels. First, more educated individuals expect higher future income and
thus have a greater economic return on health, resulting in more health investment and in longer
life expectancy. Second, wealthier individuals endow their children with more basic education,
enhancing the eﬃciency of the child’s health investment. Third, improved educational attainment
in the labor force directly increases the eﬃciency of health investment, fostering it and leading to
further improvements in life expectancy.Longevity and Education: A Macroeconomic Perspective 5
2.1 The individual problem
Suppose that individuals can live for two periods. Everyone lives during the ﬁrst period but survival
to the second period is dictated by probability π ∈ (0,1). The survival probability is an increasing
function of health-related individually purchased inputs, m. We consider an isoelastic speciﬁcation
π =m i n{zmμ, ¯ π} (1)
with ¯ π ∈ (0,1), z>0 and m ≥ 0. Our analysis focuses on the interesting case when π<¯ π.W e
consider that the following is satisﬁed
Parametric assumption 1 μ ∈ (0,1), perceived returns on intentional investment in health are
decreasing.
Remark 1 The eﬀectiveness, z, of the agent’s health investment, m, in enhancing her life ex-
pectancy, π, is perceived as being exogenously given. The value of z will be considered as being
endogenous in the next subsection, where it will be aﬀected by educational choices.
We consider the problem of an agent in her ﬁrst period of life at date t. At the beginning of
the period, the individual is endowed with basic education, bt, chosen by her parents. The agent
chooses her post-basic education level, ht (which hereafter we refer to simply as education). She
chooses how to share her remaining income between consumption, c1t, and purchases of health-
related inputs, mt. In our setting, fertility is exogenous and we assume that each agent has one child
in the second period.7 Conditional upon surviving to the second period, the agent chooses how
to share her income between consumption, c2t+1, and the purchase of her child’s basic education,
bt+1. The agent’s objective is to maximize the expected present value of the utility accruing
from consumption and from providing basic education to the child, subject to two period budget

















wt (1 − kht)=c1t + pmt (3)
wt+1 (1 + h
η
t)=c2,t+1 + κbt+1 (4)
7We abstract entirely from fertility choices and population dynamics. Since each adult has one child, the pop-
ulation decreases at rate 1 − πt. We could assume instead an exogenous fertility rate equal to 1+nt =1 /πt in
order to hold population constant. This alternative assumption would make the analysis more cumbersome without
carrying along any additional insight. In fact, under this assumption the cost of providing basic education per child
is increasing in fertility and ultimately decreasing in longevity, a feature which reinforces our results.Longevity and Education: A Macroeconomic Perspective 6
All parameters and variables are non-negative and ρ,θ,η ∈ (0,1).
According to the agent’s period budget constraints (3)-(4) education, ht,i sc o s t l yi nt e r m s
of forgone ﬁrst period labor income, through the eﬀort-cost parameter k. First period income is
allocated to the numeraire consumption good and to purchases of medical inputs at relative price
p. Second period labor income is an increasing and concave function of education. It is spent on
consumption and on child’s basic education at relative price κ.
Remark 2 Second period sub-utility is discounted according to two factors: the subjective discount
factor, ρ, and the endogenous survival probability. Since the agent takes into account the impact
of her consumption of health-related inputs, mt, on her life expectancy according to (1) she faces
endogenous discounting.
Remark 3 We assume that the agent values her child’s basic education in the same way as she
values consumption. Second period sub-utility is a function of the “consumption bundle” of two
diﬀerentiated goods: c2t+1 and bt+1.8
Remark 4 From the individual point of view basic education, bt+1, is not an investment good since
it does not aﬀect the exogenous component of the child’s future income, wt+2,o rh i se ﬀort-cost of
education, k.9
Remark 5 Child’s basic education is valued independently of its impact on child’s income, longevity
or utility. The alternative speciﬁcation of assuming parents care about the child’s utility would give
rise to a more complex recursive problem, where parental choice of basic education takes into ac-
count its inﬂuence on child’s behavior through enhanced life expectancy.10
Remark 6 We assume bt is entirely determined by parents at t − 1. This is a reasonable and
empirically plausible assumption. Basic education creates the intergenerational link analogous to
bequests. Later on, we allow for basic education to aﬀect the eﬃciency of health investment.
Nevertheless, own basic education will remain out of the individual’s choice set.11
8This approach is equivalent to the one of Galor and Weil (2000), who deﬁne parents’ preferences over a bundle
of two goods: the consumption good and potential aggregate income of oﬀsprings. The latter is the product of
children quantity and their per capita human capital, itself an increasing function of education supplied by parents.
9Only Soares(2005) and Cervellati and Sunde (2007) consider basic and higher education separately. In these
papers, basic education is provided by parents as in ours, but it is productive because it reduces the eﬀort-cost of
higher education. Nevertheless, in these papers individually optimal behavior prescribes a choice of higher education
independent of the endowment of basic education (Soares, 2005), or of a ﬁxed and exogenous level of basic education
(Cervellati and Sunde, 2007). These results are due to assumed linearities in technology and preferences (see section
E in Soares, 2005). Because we choose to work with non linear technologies and preferences, we prefer to abstract
from the productive role of basic education in facilitating the acquisition of higher education.
10It could be argued that this alternative approach reﬂects a paternalistic approach to altruism, whereas our
approach instead rests on a liberal view of altruism according to which the parent perceives a moral duty to endow
her child with the basic means to freely make his own choices.
11If we adopted the assumption by which each individual internalized the eﬀect of her educational choice onLongevity and Education: A Macroeconomic Perspective 7
Remark 7 Education is the only form of investment and aﬀects permanent income.12 Its marginal
rate of return in terms of current potential consumption is ηwt+1h
η
t/(wtkht), i.e., an increasing
function of the growth rate of wages and the educational sector’s eﬃciency measured by η and 1/k.
We drop time subscripts where this does not lead to confusion, use (1)-(2) and substitute for





[wt (1 − kh) − pm]
1−σ + ρzmμ 1
1 − σ
n
[wt+1 (1 + hη) − κb]
θ b1−θ
o1−σ
An interior solution to this problem should satisfy the following ﬁrst order conditions with respect











1 = ρμzmμ−1 1
1 − σ
n








System (3)-(7) solves for the ﬁve endogenous variables c1, c2, m, h and b. We adopt the following
Parametric assumption 2 σ ∈ (0,1), substitution eﬀects dominate income eﬀects.
It emerges clearly from (6) that this assumption is necessary for existence of an interior solution
for m, given that the marginal and absolute values of utility have the same sign only in this case.13
From the second period budget constraint (4) we see that the rule dictated by (7) consists
in spending constant shares of income on each diﬀerentiated good c2 = θ/[wt+1(1 + hη)] and











wt+1 (1 + hη) (9)
own survival probability, the problem would become non concave in general. In fact, the feature of endogenous
discounting reinforces complementarity between health related investment and education. Our assumption allows
for this type of feedbacks while ensuring existence of a solution to the individual problem and of an equilibrium
solution (see the role of assumption 4 in the proof for existence of a unique equilibrium).
12Previous versions of this paper included savings. The main features of the results are not aﬀected by the
introduction of savings. However, results are more often ambiguous in that case due to wealth eﬀects arising from
redistribution of savings from non-surviving individuals.
13This restrictive assumption is also necessary in Chakraborty and Das (2005).
14Substituting b from (9) in (8) and the result in the objective function we obtain u(c1t)+ρπ (vt+1)=[ wt −pm−
wtkh]1−σ/(1 − σ)+ρzmμ[θθ(1 − θ)1−θwt+1(1 + hη)]1−σ/(1 − σ), which is concave in h.Longevity and Education: A Macroeconomic Perspective 8













w h e r ew eh a v ed e ﬁned a ≡ θ
θ(1−σ) (1 − θ)
−θ(1−σ) κθ(1−σ). Combining (10) and (11) to eliminate






wt (1 + hη)h1−η (12)

















































wt (1 + hη)h1−η = wt (1 − kh) ≡ RHS (h) (14)
We adopt the following
Parametric assumption 3 σ ≥ μ, ﬁrst-period consumption is monotonically increasing in edu-
cation (∂c1/∂h > 0).
This additional condition is suﬃcient to obtain the results gathered in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Under assumptions 1-3 there exists a unique interior solution to the individual
problem, given by the level of education h satisfying (14) and basic education, health investment,
life expectancy and consumption as given by (9), (12), (1), (13) and (7) respectively.
Changes in parameters aﬀect individual behavior, hence endogenous variables, according to the
signs reported in Table 1.
Proof. Assumption 3, together with previous assumptions, implies that the LHS of eq. (14) is
increasing (up from zero) and concave, while the RHS is linear in h and decreasing from wt down
to zero for h =1 /k. The two sides of equation (14) cross once and only once (see ﬁgure 1).15 For




η or equivalently σ>μ− (1 − μ)
1−η
η (1 + hη)/hη.T h er i g h t -
hand-side of this last inequality is increasing in h but lower than μ−(1 − μ)
1−η
η (1 + kη) for h ≤ 1/k. Hence, anotherLongevity and Education: A Macroeconomic Perspective 9
Table 1: Comparative statics for individual behavior‡
higher health basic ﬁrst period second period life
education investment education consumption consumption expectancy
hmb c 1 c2 π
eﬃciency of health
investment, z +++ - + +
cost of health
services, p - - -+ - -
eﬀort-cost of
education, k - −† -+ - −†
cost of basic
education, κ --- +--
‡ : Bold signs denote reinforced eﬀects where more than one variable act in the same direction.
† : These signs are ambiguous. As shown in appendix A.1 a suﬃcient condition for them to be negative is
























p r o o fo ft h ec o m p a r a t i v es t a t i ce x e r c i s e sr e p o r t e di nT a b l e1s e ea p p e n d i xA . 1 .
Remark 8 From Table 1 it is apparent that we should observe positive correlations across indi-
viduals (or countries) between higher education, basic education, private health-related investment
and life expectancy. This is at odds with van Zon and Muysken’s result of a negative correlation
between health investment and education (van Zon and Muysken, 2001, p.180).
Remark 9 The positive correlation between h and π is obtained without any external eﬀect of
education on longevity. There are two forces at work. First, higher longevity improves the expected
payoﬀ to education. In this case, causality runs from π to h. This is common in the literature.16
Second, more education increases permanent income allowing the agent to invest more in health.
This channel underscores causality from h to π even in this context of individual choice without
externalities at work. This is an original feature of our model.
2.2 Externalities at the stationary symmetric equilibrium
We now introduce educational externalities on health status by assuming that education aﬀects the
eﬃciency of health investment, i.e., parameter z. From the individual point of view, private health-
suﬃcient assumption for ∂c1/∂h > 0 is σ ≥ μ − (1 − μ)
1−η
η (1 + kη) which is less restrictive that assumption 3.
16This same result is obtained in a large body of literature analyzing the eﬀect of exogenous mortality reductions
on economic performance. See Ehrlich and Lui (1991) where altruistic parents educate their children, de la Croix and
Licandro (1999) and Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder and Weil (2000) where increased longevity raises educational investment
and reduces human capital depreciation, Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) where lower mortality pushes parents to







Figure 1: The equilibrium level of education: a representation of condition (14)
related investment is the more productive the greater are own basic education, public health-related
services, and the average level of education in the economy.
Own basic education, bt, enhances the individual’s ability to take advantage of health services.
Supply of public health services is considered exogenous and denoted by st. It can be interpreted
as a pure public good, aﬀecting for instance the rate at which households are subject to diseases.
The average post-basic education level in the generation, ¯ ht, acts as a pure externality because it
improves the quality of the health service sector by, for instance, facilitating the use and diﬀusion
of best practices.












where ζ>0 is a scale parameter and δ, α, β ∈ (0,1).
By deﬁnition, at the stationary symmetric equilibrium we have that ∀t17
ht = ¯ ht , bt = bt+1 and wt = wt+1
17From equation (14) it appears that in this model constant growth in wages can be compatible with constant
educational investment only under speciﬁc assumptions concerning the dynamics of cost parameter, p, κ and k.T o
the extent that these costs are treated as exogenous it doesn’t seem much rewarding to push the analysis in this
direction to consider income growth.Longevity and Education: A Macroeconomic Perspective 11






















To ensure that c1 is increasing in h we make the additional
Parametric assumption 4 α ≤ (1 − η)(1− μ) and β ≤ σ − μ, the external eﬀects of education
on the eﬃciency of private health investment are small.
Using expression (16) to substitute for c1 in the ﬁrst period budget constraint (3) along with
(12) for m,w eh a v et h ee q u a t i o nd e ﬁning the equilibrium level of h:
























w(1 + hη)h1−η = w(1 − kh) ≡ RHS (h) (17)
which coincides with (14) for α = β =0and ζsδ = z.
Finally using (9) and (12) to substitute for b and m in (15), we can write life expectancy at the











sδ [w(1 + hη)]
μ+β hμ(1−η)+α (18)
We are now ready to state the following results:
Proposition 2 In the presence of moderate externalities from education on life expectancy, i.e.
under assumptions 1-4, there exists a unique equilibrium characterized by an interior solution
h ∈ (0,1/k). The stronger the externalities of education on life expectancy are, i.e., the larger α and
β, the greater are higher education, basic education, health related investment and life expectancy
at equilibrium. These are positively correlated and react to changes in parameters as reported in
Table 2.
Proof. Under assumption 4 the ] LHS in (17) is an increasing function of h. Mutatis mutandis the
s a m ep r o o fa st h eo n eo fp r o p o s i t i o n1a p p l i e si nt h i sc a s e .
To prove the second part of the proposition, we compare the solution of eq. (14) to that of eq. (17).
Notice that the ] LHS in (17) is ﬂatter than the LHS in (14) since ∂c1/∂h is smaller (the exponent
of h in the ﬁrst term of the ] LHS is positive under assumption 4 but smaller than the one in the
ﬁrst term of the LHS). Since in both cases the left-hand-side starts at zero, we have in terms of
ﬁgure 1 that ] LHS lies everywhere below the LHS schedule. Given that the right-hand-sides ofLongevity and Education: A Macroeconomic Perspective 12
Table 2: Comparative statics with externalities‡
higher health basic life





services, p - - - -
eﬀort-cost of
education, k - −† - −†
cost of basic
education, κ --- -
exogenous comp.
of income, w ++++
‡ : Bold signs denote reinforced eﬀects where more than one variable act in the same direction.
† : These signs are ambiguous in general. As shown in appendix A.2 a suﬃcient condition for them to be negative
is


































equations (14) and (17) coincide, the value of h solving (17) is greater than h solving (14). Finally,
b and m are increasing functions of h, while π is increasing in all of these three variables.
For the proof of the comparative static exercises reported in Table 2 see appendix A.2.
Remark 10 Externalities make the link between h and π stronger. In the data, the positive corre-
lation between education and longevity should be stronger in the presence of the externalities (i.e.
α,β > 0) than in the case without externalities (i.e. the solution to the individual problem).
Remark 11 Longevity is increasing in public health inputs s and in the exogenous component of
income, w.18 Improved public health services have a direct positive eﬀect on π and an indirect eﬀect
running through increased h (see eq. 19 in appendix A.2). Higher w has a similar indirect eﬀect
through increased h,a n dt w od i r e c te ﬀects on π (see eq. 20) due to greater purchases of private
health-related inputs, m, and higher levels of basic education, b,b o t hd r i v e nb yap u r ei n c o m ee ﬀect.
Remark 12 Our theory predicts that causation between longevity and higher education runs in
both directions (i)o n ef r o mg r e a t e rπ to higher h (as suggested by the result in the previous sub-
section) and (ii) one from higher h to greater π in the presence of externalities. Inspection of
18From eq. (18), life expectancy is also increasing in second period income w(1+hη), which however is endogenous.Longevity and Education: A Macroeconomic Perspective 13
equilibrium longevity (18) highlights that the second causal link hinges on the strength of external-
ities through the role of basic education, β, and average higher education, α, in fostering health,
and on the elasticity of longevity with respect to private health investment, μ. The latter mea-
sures the importance of the second link discussed in Remark 9, according to which more education
raises permanent income fostering health investment and longevity (role of μ). Similarly, since
more education implies higher permanent income, it implies greater parental investment in child’s
basic education which improves the eﬃciency of the child’s health investment, resulting again in
enhanced longevity (role of β). Finally, higher investment in education improves the eﬃciency of
health investment directly through the externality, leading to longer life expectancy (role of α).
The empirical relevance of our hypothesis according to which education aﬀects life expectancy
is the subject matter of the rest of the paper.
3D a t a d e s c r i p t i o n
In this section, we describe the data set we have assembled to test our main hypotheses and take
a ﬁrst look at the relationship of longevity with each of the candidate health input variables. The
focus of our study, a country’s longevity, is measured by the average life expectancy at birth. The
World Development Indicators (WDI) 2005 database provides data on life expectancy at birth,
physicians per thousand people, real health expenditure per person19, sanitation (deﬁned as the
percentage of the population with access to improved sanitation facilities), and GDP per capita in
PPP dollars. We obtained primary and higher education attainment rates from the Barro and Lee
(2001) dataset. We also use a measure of the incidence of AIDS (deﬁned as number of cases per
thousand persons) from Papageorgiou and Stoytcheva (2006) in an eﬀort to control for the adverse
eﬀe c t so ft h eA I D Se p i d e m i co nh e a l t hs t a t u s .
We were able to put together the above series for 71 countries, shown in Table 5 in the appendix.
The great majority of these series are not available frequently over time and in some cases the data
are exceedingly sparse in the time dimension. Because the cross-sectional dimension of the dataset
is more complete and, more importantly, because of the inherent long-run nature of the relation
under study, we opted for exploring empirically the cross-sectional dimension of our dataset. That
19This is total health expenditure per capita in constant dollars. Total health expenditure is the sum of public
and private expenditures as a ratio of the population and covers provision of preventive and curative health services,
family planning, nutrition activities, and health-designated emergency aid. It excludes provision of water and san-
itation. Private health expenditure includes direct household out-of-pocket spending, private insurance, charitable
donations and direct service payments by private corporations. Public health expenditure consists of recurrent and
capital spending from central and local government budgets, external borrowing and grants (including donations
from international agencies and nongovernmental organizations), and social or compulsory health insurance funds.
Data are in current U.S. dollars and converted to contant dollars by deﬂating using the US CPI.Longevity and Education: A Macroeconomic Perspective 14
is, we average the available data over the period 1995 to 2004 for life expectancy, and 1961 to 1995
for the explanatory variables subject to availability.
A ﬁrst look at the data
Our model suggests that a country’s life expectancy at birth is positively correlated to private
and public health investment (measured by health spending, physicians availability and sanitation)
and to education through two distinct channels (measured by primary and higher education).
In the dataset, life expectancy has a correlation of 84 percent with higher education attainment
rates and 34 percent with basic education attainment rates. Physicians are also strongly correlated
with life expectancy at 87 percent. Moreover, sanitation and health expenditures have correlations
with life expectancy of 70 and 77 percent respectively, while aids prevalence has an unconditional
correlation with life expectancy equal to minus 22 percent. All these correlations are statistically
signiﬁcant at the one percent level, except the latter which is statistically signiﬁcant at the ten
percent level.
Nearly all candidate health inputs are strongly related with real income per capita. This is
especially true in the case of health spending (92 percent), physicians availability (89 percent)
and higher education attainment rates (80 percent). Moreover, several of these inputs are highly
correlated with each other raising a warning ﬂag regarding a potential collinearity problem in
the regression speciﬁcations that follow. Notably, the correlation of higher education attainment
r a t e sw i t hp h y s i c i a n si s8 7p e r c e n t . W et h u sc o n s i d e rs p e c i ﬁcations both with and without the
apparently highly collinear physicians-availability variable.
4 Empirical Estimation
In this section, after justifying the methodology employed, we present the empirical results obtained
using variables in levels and then their changes.
We are well aware that there is a strong argument for endogeneity between life expectancy
and tertiary education. In fact, this is one implication of our theoretical model. While we expect
tertiary education to aﬀect health outcomes, individual educational decisions depend on expected
longevity so that it is plausible that longer life expectancy causes higher education levels.
For the empirical model we consider below, we fail to reject the null that tertiary education is
exogenous with a p-value of 0.2120 and the joint hypothesis that the two education measures, the
20Treating one explanatory variable at a time as potentially endogenous and the remaining as exogenous, we also
fail to reject the null that primary education attainment rates is exogenous with a p-value of 0.78. Similarly, we
cannot reject the null that the physicians measure is exogenous with a p-value of 0.25. Nor, can we reject the null
that initial income is exogenous with a p-value of 0.52.Longevity and Education: A Macroeconomic Perspective 15
physicians variable, and per capita income are all exogenous with a p-value of 0.24. This suggests it
might be reasonable to estimate the empirical model with OLS. However, given that individual p-
values for the null of exogeneity for each explanatory variable separately range from about 0.21 for
tertiary education and physicians to 0.78 for primary enrollment rates, we choose to be conservative
regarding our inference of exogeneity and use instrumental variables (IV) estimation. This helps
take into account possible endogeneity problems we might have been unable to detect, and acts as
a robustness check for OLS estimates.
Towards the goal of addressing potential endogeneity problems and establishing some evidence
of temporal causation we consider:
(i) Using lags of higher education and the other explanatory variables21 to explain end-period
averages of life expectancy. Speciﬁcally, we utilize time averages of higher education and the
other explanatory variables for 1961-75 to explain average life expectancy over 1995-2004.
This takes care of endogeneity if individual decisions about higher education in 1961-75 are
made independently of life expectancy at birth of the next generation of individuals born
between 1995 and 2004. We present results based on this speciﬁcation as the "Lags" model
in columns two and ﬁve in Table 3.
(ii) Instrumenting the averages of tertiary education, basic education, real income per capita,
and physicians over 1961-95 by their average value during 1961-75 to explain the average
value of life expectancy over 1995-2004. In the regression of each potentially endogenous
explanatory variable22 on all exogenous variables, the lag of each explanatory variable is
shown to be strongly signiﬁcant in determining the explanatory variable’s period average,
with p-values always below the one percent level of signiﬁcance. Although it is not possible
to test for identiﬁcation, strong rejection of the null that our instruments have no impact on
the potentially endogenous explanatory variable is important for the ﬁnite sample properties
of the IV estimator, as explained in Wooldridge (2002, p.86). We present results based on
IV estimation in columns three and six labeled "IV" in Table 3.
(iii) We use log changes in the explanatory variables for the period 1961-75 to explain log changes
in life expectancy for 1961-2004 in Table 4 (and for 1977-2004 in appendix Table 6). We
report results from this exercise as the "Lags" model in columns two and ﬁve of Table 4.
21We cannot use lags for sanitation for which we usually have just a single observation for each country during
the end of the period, per capita health spending for which we have just a handful of time series observations per
country, and aids which appears only in the second half of the period under consideration.
22Again, even though we fail to reject the null of exogeneity for any of these variables and jointly for all of these
variables, we are being conservative in allowing for the possibility that these could be endogenous.Longevity and Education: A Macroeconomic Perspective 16
(iv) We apply IV estimation to the variables in changes, instrumenting the log change in primary
and tertiary education over 1961-95 by their 1961-75 value. Results based on this approach
are reported in columns three and six under the label "IV" of Table 4, and in the respective
columns of Table 6 in the appendix.
In addition to the "Lags" and "IV" models described above in (i) and (ii), we assess the link
between health inputs and life expectancy using the period-averages ("Period Avg") model where
average life expectancy for 1995-2004 is explained by the average value of the explanatory variables
over 1961-95. We report results for this model in columns one and four of Table 3. All variables
considered in the regression speciﬁcations are in natural logarithms so that the reported estimates
are elasticities of life expectancy with respect to each explanatory variable.
Estimates based on log changes of the variables are presented in Table 4. In this case, all
variables other than the log of the initial (1961) level of real income per capita are in log changes.
In addition to the "Lags" and "IV" models described above in (iii) and (iv), we also consider
the "Period Avg" model. In this case, the growth rate of life expectancy between 1961 to 2004
is explained by growth rates of the explanatory variables between 1961 and 1995, with results
presented in the ﬁrst and fourth columns of Table 4. In Table 6 of the appendix, we also present
estimates obtained when explaining end-of-period average life expectancy changes between 1977
and 2004, to show robustness of the main ﬁnding regarding the importance of higher education in
determining future health improvements.
As noted previously, we consider speciﬁcations without and with the physicians measure in
Models 1 and 2 respectively, since this is highly collinear with higher education. Finally, we note
that heteroskedasticity-consistent ﬁnite sample standard errors have been used in all estimations.
Estimates for speciﬁcations in levels
In Model 1 of Table 3, we consider the impact of basic and higher education attainment rates
as well as real income per capita, sanitation, health spending per capita, and AIDS per thousand
population, on end-period (1995-2004) average life expectancy. We report results from Model
1i nt h eﬁrst three columns of Table 3. Irrespective of whether we consider the average value
of the explanatory variables over 1961-95, their average value at the beginning of the period, or
instrument the former with the latter, higher education attainment rates consistently have positive
and strongly signiﬁcant impact on life expectancy which is at least as important as the impact
of primary education. The elasticity of life expectancy with respect to higher education ranges
from 3.8 percent for the lags model to 5.1 percent for IV estimation, and 5.5 percent for the
period-averages model. With most countries in our sample having small average values of higherLongevity and Education: A Macroeconomic Perspective 17
Table 3: Explaining 1995-2004 averages of life expectancy






































































































Adj. R2 81.37 8 .98 1 .28 3 .88 0 .18 3 .5
Obs. 71 71 71 71 70 70
Notes: * p-value less than one percent, ** p-value less than ﬁve percent, *** p-value less than ten percent.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent ﬁnite sample standard errors are used in constructing t-statistics. All variables
are in natural logarithms so that the reported estimates are elasticities of life expectancy with respect to each
explanatory variable. For "Period Avg" models, we consider 1995-2004 averages of life expectancy being explained
by 1961-95 averages for the explanatory variables. For "Lags" models, we consider again 1995-2004 averages of life
expectancy being explained in this case by 1961-75 averages of the education, physicians, and income variables.
Finally, for "IV" Models 1 and 2, we instrument the 1961-95 period averages of the education, income, and
physicians variables using their beginning of period averages.
education attainment23, these estimated eﬀects would then suggest that if in fact higher education
operated only within the individual household in improving life expectancy, the relatively small
proportion of households with higher education attainment would have to experience unrealistically
large improvements in life expectancy for the population average to be eﬀected as much as we ﬁnd
in the aggregate data. We interpret our estimated results as evidence for an external eﬀect of
higher education on life expectancy.
The estimated elasticity of life expectancy with respect to primary education ranges from 4.4
and 4.6 percent and marginally insigniﬁcant for the lags and IV models respectively, to 5.4 percent
and marginally signiﬁcant at the ten percent level for the period-averages model. Sanitation has
a positive impact estimated to be signiﬁcant in two of the three estimations for Model 1. The
incidence of AIDS has a negative and strongly signiﬁcant impact on life expectancy in all three
estimations for Model 1.
We also take into account of the fact that income can be a major determinant of health by
including 1961-95 and initial period time-averages of real income per capita in the regression
speciﬁcations presented in the ﬁrst and second columns of Table 3 respectively, and instrumenting
2369 percent of countries in our sample had attainment rates less than 2 percent in 1960, 48 percent had rates less
than 5 percent in 1975, and 53 percent had rates less than 10 percent even by 1995. The average across countries
was around 3 percent for the period from 1961 to 1975 and about 6 percent for 1961-1995.Longevity and Education: A Macroeconomic Perspective 18
the former using the latter average for the speciﬁcation reported in the third column. Real income
per capita largely determines individual purchasing power for rival inputs related to health. These
would include medical expenditures but also spending on food.24 Controlling for income helps
isolate the part of the eﬀect of each input that is unrelated to income. For the speciﬁcations
reported in the ﬁrst three columns of Table 3, income has a positive but insigniﬁcant impact on life
expectancy. Collinearity might be behind the ﬁnding of an insigniﬁcant impact of income on life
expectancy once we control for other health inputs through which income impacts upon health.
For instance, real per capita income and real health expenditure per person have a correlation
of 92 percent. When considering income without health spending in the regression (not shown
in Table 3), income comes in as a positive and signiﬁcant determinant of life expectancy for all
three speciﬁcations of Model 1, consistent with its role as facilitator of rival health-related inputs
purchases. Similarly, whereas excluding income from the regression speciﬁcations (not shown in
Table 3) renders health spending positive and signiﬁcant in all three speciﬁcations of Model 1,
including it renders it insigniﬁcant except for the lags estimation in the second column of Table 3.
In columns four to six of Table 3, we report results for Model 2 which incorporates physicians
availability in addition to the two education variables, sanitation, real per capita health spending,
AIDS per thousand population, and real income per capita. To the extent that physicians help ab-
sorb and disseminate medical or health-related information across and within countries, in addition
to their role as a rival health input, including it should diminish the impact otherwise captured
by the measure of higher education.25 Indeed this is the case. As physicians and higher education
are highly collinear, with a correlation of 87 percent (compared to 39 percent with primary educa-
tion), introducing physicians dampens the impact of higher education on life expectancy. Still, it
remains positive and signiﬁcant, irrespective of whether we use period-averages, lags, or instrument
the explanatory variables, in columns four, ﬁve, and six respectively. This impact ranges from 2.2
percent for the lags estimation to 3.3 percent for the period-averages and IV estimations.
The estimated life expectancy elasticity of primary education remains positive but is now
statistically insigniﬁcant throughout the three speciﬁcations of Model 2. Sanitation retains a
positive and signiﬁcant impact on life expectancy while health spending per capita is now estimated
to have no impact on life expectancy. The latter result is the case irrespective of whether or
24Thus, including income conforms with Fogel’s (1994) emphasis on nutrition as a determinant of health.
25Physicians play a dual role: ﬁrst, as a direct rival input into the health production function and second,
as facilitators of health-related knowledge absorption and dissemination. Including both tertiary education and
physicians in the same speciﬁcation for Model 2 should thus be expected to reduce coeﬃcient estimates for tertiary
education to the extent these two variables capture the same concept. Thus, coeﬃcient estimates for tertiary
e d u c a t i o ni nt h e s es p e c i ﬁcations should be viewed as a lower bound for the importance of the knowledge externality
we are focusing on in this paper. Here, we are attributing all of the impact of physicians to its direct role in the
health production function, understating the overall eﬀect of health-related knowledge. Alternatively, excluding
physicians, leads to a considerable increase in magnitude for higher education estimates.Longevity and Education: A Macroeconomic Perspective 19
Table 4: Explaining changes in life expectancy between 1961 and 2004




























































































Adj. R2 32.63 0 .33 2 .24 4 .44 6 .24 3 .2
Obs. 66 66 66 63 63 63
Notes: Notes: * p-value less than ten percent, ** p-value less than ﬁve percent, *** p-value less than one percent.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent ﬁnite sample standard errors are used in constructing t-statistics. All variables are in
natural logarithms. Five countries, Bangladesh, Malawi, Mozambigue, Singapore and Uganda are missing relative
to the sample for Table 3. In addition, the physicians measure used in the speciﬁcations reported in columns four
to six is missing for Ghana, Iceland and Sierra Leone. All variables other than the log of the initial (1961) level
of real income per capita are in log changes. YGROWTH is the growth rate of real income per capita. For the
"Period Avg" models, we consider the growth rate of life expectancy between 1961 and 2004 being explained by
growth rates of the explanatory variables between 1961 and 1995. For the "Lags" model 1, we consider again the
growth rate of life expectancy between 1961 and 2004 being explained by growth rates of the education variables
between 1961 and 1975. Finally, for the "IV" Models 1 and 2, we instrument the 1961-95 period changes for the
education variables using their beginning of period averages.
not we include income per capita in the regression speciﬁcations. Similarly, once we include a
measure for physicians, the impact of income per capita is estimated to be indistinguishable from
zero irrespective of whether or not health spending is included in the estimation. Moreover, the
estimated impact of AIDS remains negative and strongly signiﬁcant. Finally, physicians availability
has positive and strongly signiﬁcant impact on life expectancy that is stable between six and seven
percent, irrespective of the methodology being pursued.
Overall, we ﬁnd that higher education matters signiﬁcantly and is more robust than basic edu-
cation, sanitation, health spending, and income. Using initial period averages to explain end-period
life expectancy along with IV estimation, we establish that tertiary education is a signiﬁcant and
robust determinant of end of period health status. Our approach alleviates potential endogeneity
problems and provides supporting evidence of a causality link from tertiary education to longevity.
Estimates for changes in variables speciﬁcation
As an additional methodology to remedy potential endogeneity problems facing tertiary edu-
cation as a determinant of future improvements in life expectancy, we consider log changes of the
variables instead of their log levels. This serves as a robustness check for our main ﬁnding regard-
ing the relative importance of higher education for life expectancy. When considering changes,Longevity and Education: A Macroeconomic Perspective 20
we have to exclude our measures of public sanitation and health spending per capita because of
limited data availability over time for these health inputs. We now include changes in real income
per capita over the period as a proxy of the growth rate of private health inputs, given that income
per capita is a reasonably good measure of purchasing power.
We report estimates from this exercise in Table 4 where we seek to explain changes in life
expectancy between 1961 and 2004. The growth rate of higher education attainment levels has
positive impact on end-period growth rates in life expectancy for all speciﬁcations we consider.
It takes its highest value of about six percent in the IV speciﬁcation reported in column three.
The growth rate of primary education has a positive eﬀect higher than that for tertiary education
and is statistically signiﬁcant except for the speciﬁcation in column four where it is marginally
insigniﬁcant.26 It takes its highest value of about seven percent in the IV speciﬁcation reported
in column three. The estimated impact of AIDS is negative as we should expect, and statistically
signiﬁcant in most speciﬁcations. The growth rate of physicians comes in positive and strongly
signiﬁcant conﬁrming the importance of the per capita number of physicians in determining health
outcomes suggested by the estimation in levels earlier.
Initial income has a negative statistically signiﬁcant impact on changes in life expectancy be-
tween 1961 and 2004 across the board. This is consistent with convergence in life expectancy for
countries that started with low real income per capita levels in 1961.27 T h eg r o w t hr a t eo fr e a l
income per capita does not explain any of these gains in life expectancy, suggesting that any gains
in life expectancy occurring for initially low-income countries have not been due to higher real
income per capita growth in poor countries but likely due to changes in non-income determinants
of public health in laggard countries. For example, faster technology absorption (including im-
plementation of public health technologies) of initially laggard countries might actually be behind
observed improvements in life expectancy.
26The result about the relative magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance of basic education is not robust when
estimating the impact of the same explanatory variables on end-of-period life expectancy changes between 1977 and
2004. In this case, the estimated coeﬃcients for basic education fall and are statistically insigniﬁcant in all three
speciﬁcations for Model 2. In contrast, the estimated coeﬃcients for higher education are nearly unchanged and
remain statistically signiﬁcant across the board in explaining end-of-period life expectancy changes, suggesting that
higher education is an important determinant of improvements in future health outcomes. Table 6 in the appendix
reports the results of this estimation exercise.
27Evans (1997) shows the coeﬃc i e n te s t i m a t ef o ri n i t i a li n c o m ea n dt h ei m p l i e dr a t eo fc o n v e r g e n c et ob eb i a s e d
downwards; failing to account for all sources of heterogeneity across countries has the same eﬀect as measurement
error, biasing the coeﬃcient estimate of initial income and the implied rate of convergence towards zero. Thus,
evidence of convergence shown here is likely a lower bound.Longevity and Education: A Macroeconomic Perspective 21
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper presents the results of a macroeconomic analysis of the role of education and other de-
terminants of life expectancy in order to shed some light on the factors responsible for international
diﬀerences in health performance.
We have presented a theoretical model where intentional investment in health by individuals
and external eﬀects of education on the eﬃciency of this investment, are considered in a uniﬁed
framework. This allows us to illustrate the complexity of the relation between education and
longevity. The causation is bidirectional: longer life expectancy encourages more education by
increasing its rate of return and, on the other hand, more education causes longevity. We have
advanced three reasons for the latter to be the case. First, better educated agents expect to earn
higher future income and have a greater economic return on health, so that they choose to invest
more on their own health. Second, these same agents can provide their children with more or
better basic education, enhancing the eﬃciency of these children’s investment in health. Third,
the eﬃciency of health investment may directly beneﬁt from the average education level in the
economy by enhancing, for instance, the economy’s absorptive capacity.
Our empirical results conﬁrm the importance of educational attainment rates in explaining
cross-country variation in life expectancy at birth. In addition to the well established health
eﬀect of primary education, we ﬁnd a direct external eﬀect of tertiary education on longevity
which is as high as six percent. This estimated eﬀect along with the observed small proportion of
households having attained higher education, indicates that the estimated eﬀect of higher education
attainment rates is indeed largely due to an externality. Our ﬁndings then provide evidence of a
form of increasing returns to scale in education as far as longevity is concerned. This contrasts
with evidence on the determinants of economic growth pointing to decreasing returns to scale in
education, with primary education being the single most important factor for income growth and
higher education having little or no explanatory power (see Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller
2004).
These ﬁndings are robust with respect to our attempts to take into account the endogeneity of
higher education. Moreover, results are obtained controlling for other well-established explanatory
variables of longevity: real per capita income, real per capita health expenditure, sanitation, AIDS
prevalence, and physicians availability. It is noteworthy that the important role of physicians avail-
ability comes to the expense of the role of the higher education attainment rate. This supports the
idea that the educational externality captures society’s absorptive capacity, given that physicians
are not just another rival health input but constitute a main carrier of health-related informa-Longevity and Education: A Macroeconomic Perspective 22
tion across and within countries. Public health inputs, measured by sanitation, have a positive
impact on life expectancy, consistent with Soares (2007b) in relation to Brazil and with evidence
summarized in the review articles of Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney (2006) and Soares (2007a).
Finally, we ﬁnd that the growth rate of real income per capita does not explain improvements
in life expectancy between 1961 and 2004. This is consistent with non-income explanations of gains
in longevity. These include changes in tertiary education attainment rates related to the direct
external eﬀect interpretation of our theoretical model, but could also include changes in public
inputs as suggested by Soares (2007a), and diﬀerent medical knowledge diﬀusion channels as in
Papageorgiou, Savvides, and Zachariadis (2007).
The results presented in this paper suggest that there is scope for studying the determinants
of welfare growth as a concept that is (closely related but) distinct from economic growth. In
fact, non-income factors are shown to be important for explaining variation of life expectancy
across countries. Policy implications may be important. For instance, the ﬁndings of this paper
suggest that investing in health inputs might be important for welfare growth even if the eﬀect
of health on economic growth is small as in Weil (2007), or non-existent as in Acemoglu and
Johnson (2008). While the latter’s “estimates exclude any positive eﬀects of life expectancy on
GDP per capita” (p. 3), they acknowledge that consistent with Becker, Philipson, and Soares
(2005), “[health] interventions have considerably improved overall welfare” (p. 4). Our analysis
highlights the crucial role that educational policies may play in enhancing welfare, by pointing out
to the role education plays in inﬂuencing the health component of welfare.Longevity and Education: A Macroeconomic Perspective 23
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AA p p e n d i x
A.1 Proof of proposition 1
Preliminary. Recall that from (14)
LHS (h) ≡ c1 (h)+pm(h)
where c1 (h) and m(h) are given by (13) and (12) respectively. Consider (14) and write it in
implicit form as
F (h,x) ≡ c1 (h)+pm(h)+wtkh− wt =0
where x denotes a parameter with respect to which comparative statics exercises are performed.





















Impact of z. An exogenous increase in z shifts downward the LHS schedule but leaves the





dz > 0 ⇒ from (1) dπ
dz = ∂π
∂z + μ π
m
dm













dz, yet the sign is determined through
graphical analysis: at the new individual solution it must be that dLHS
dz < 0 which requires that
dc1




Impact of p. An exogenous increase in p shifts upward the LHS schedule but leaves the RHS
unchanged. As a result h must decrease to restore individual optimality (more so the greater is





dp << 0 ⇒ from (1) dπ
dp = μ π
m
dm





dp < 0,f r o m( 7 )dc2
dp = θ
1−θκ db




dp > 0 (moreover at the
new individual solution dLHS
dp > 0, while expenditure in health-related inputs, pm, falls according
to (12), implying an important increase in c1).
Impact of k. An exogenous increase in k shifts upward the LHS schedule and downwards the
RHS (which pivots on its vertical intercept). As a result h must decrease to restore individual
optimality. As a consequence from (9) db
dk < 0,f r o m( 7 )dc2
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(0,1).



























































































































Both sides of this inequality are increasing and concave in h if
(i) σ>1 − μ.
Moreover the left-hand-side of the inequality starts above zero with ﬁnite slope, while the right-
hand-side starts at zero with inﬁnite slope. Under (i)f o rl o wl e v e l so fh we have dm
dk < 0 implying
dπ
dk < 0.

























This is a suﬃcient condition for the inequality implied by dm/dk < 0 to be satisﬁed for any





dk . Under (i)-(ii) the second term on the right-hand-side is
positive. Furthermore according to dh
dk
k





¯ ¯ > 1. It follows that
dkh
dk < 0, implying that also the ﬁrst term on the right-hand-side is positive. Overall dc1
dk > 0 under
conditions (i)-(ii).
Impact of κ. An exogenous increase in κ shifts upward the LHS schedule but leaves the





dκ < 0 ⇒ from (1) dπ
dκ = μ π
m
dm
dκ < 0. Given that at the new individual
solution dLHS
dκ > 0, but expenditure in health-related inputs, pm, falls while income increases (as
kh falls), c1 must increase substantially. Moreover from (9) db









dκ = θwt+1ηhη−1 dh
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A.2 Proof of proposition 2
Impact of s. An exogenous increase in s shifts downward the ] LHS schedule but leaves the RHS
unchanged since d ] LHS
ds = −δc1/s with c1 given by (16). As a result h must increase to restore

























which is increasing in the strength of the externalities α and β.
Impact of p. An exogenous increase in p shifts upward the ] LHS schedule but leaves the RHS










dp < 0. The total eﬀect on π is reinforced by the
fact that m, b and h move in the same direction (see eq. 15).
Impact of k. An exogenous increase in k shifts upward the ] LHS schedule and downwards the
RHS (which pivots on its vertical intercept). As a result h must decrease to restore equilibrium. As
a consequence from (9) db







































¯ ¯ applying the same method as in the proof of proposition 1 taking into account
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1
σ[σ−(1−η)(1−μ)+α]







σ > 0 for h =0 . The left-hand-side is increasing and
concave up from zero for h =0 ,i fσ −(1 − η)(1− μ)+α>0.As u ﬃcient condition for the latter
to be satisﬁed is that
(iii) σ>1 − μ − α
which is less restrictive than corresponding condition (i) for the case of the individual solution.



































This condition is satisﬁed, for instance, for low enough values of k.
Impact of κ. An exogenous increase in κ shifts upward the ] LHS schedule but leaves the
RHS unchanged. As a result h must decrease to restore individual optimality. The shift in the
] LHS, ∂ ] LHS
∂κ =( 1 − σ + β)c1/κ, is relatively large as compared to that of the LHS of (14),
∂LHS
∂κ =( 1− σ)c1/κ, which implies that the adjustment of h is larger with externalities than








h < 0 and from (9) that
db











κ << 0 (this adjustment is much larger with externalities
than without since b is higher as results from proposition 2 and equation 9, and at the same time





















where only the last term is plays a role in the case without externalities.
Impact of w. To determine the direction of adjustment of h, ﬁrst divide both sides of (17) by w,
so as to see that an increase in w shifts downwards only the ﬁrst term of the (modiﬁed) LHS.T h i s
implies that h must increase to restore equilibrium. Moreover from (9) db







and from (12) dm























The complete impact on life expectancy of an increase in the exogenous component of income is
much stronger in the presence of externalities than without them.Longevity and Education: A Macroeconomic Perspective 29
Table 5: List of countries in the dataset
Country Avg Life Expectancy† Country Avg Life Expectancy†
Algeria 70.3 Korea 75.7
Argentina 73.9 Malawi 40.8
Australia 78.9 Malaysia 72.7
Austria 78.0 Mali 47.7
Bangladesh 61.5 Mauritius 71.3
Belgium 77.7 Mexico 74.4
Bolivia 63.1 Mozambique 42.6
Brazil 69.7 Myanmar 59.5
Cameroon 47.2 Netherlands 78.0
Canada 78.8 New Zealand 78.1
Chile 76.9 Norway 78.6
Colombia 71.5 Pakistan 63.2
Costa Rica 77.6 Panama 74.4
Cyprus 78.3 Paraguay 70.4
Denmark 76.5 Peru 69.3
Ecuador 73.4 Philippines 69.5
El Salvador 70.1 Portugal 76.2
Finland 77.5 Sierra Leone 40.3
France 78.8 Singapore 77.9
Germany 77.7 Spain 78.9
Ghana 56.8 Sri Lanka 73.6
Greece 78.2 Sudan 55.9
Guatemala 66.2 Sweden 79.6
Haiti 50.8 Switzerlannd 79.7
Honduras 67.4 Tanzania 47.2
Iceland 78.8 Thailand 69.7
India 62.8 Tunisia 72.4
Indonesia 65.9 Turkey 68.1
Iran 69.5 Uganda 45.7
Ireland 76.9 United Kingdom 77.6
Israel 78.3 Unites States 76.7
Italy 79.2 Uruguay 74.3
Jamaica 71.1 Venezuela 73.0
Japan 80.9 Zambia 38.4
Jordan 70.7 Zimbabwe 40.7
Kenya 49.2
†: This is the end of period average life expectancy from 1995 to 2004. Iceland is missing for the lags and IV
models.Longevity and Education: A Macroeconomic Perspective 30
Table 6: Considering end-of-period life expectancy changes


























































































Adj. R2 16.71 4 .11 6 .52 9 .33 0 .72 8 .3
Obs. 66 66 66 63 63 63
Notes: * p-value less than ten percent, ** p-value less than ﬁve percent, *** p-value less than one percent.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent ﬁnite sample standard errors are used in constructing t-statistics. All variables are
in natural logarithms. Five countries, Bangladesh, Malawi, Mozambigue, Singapore and Uganda are missing
relative to the sample for Table 5. In addition, the physicians measure used in the speciﬁcations reported in
columns four to six is missing for Ghana, Iceland and Sierra Leone. All variables other than the log of the initial
(1961) level of real income per capita are in log changes. YGROWTH is the growth rate of real income per
capita. For the "Period Avg" models, we consider the growth rate of life expectancy between 1977 and 2004
being explained by growth rates of the explanatory variables between 1961 and 1995. For the "Lags" model 1,
we consider again the growth rate of life expectancy between 1977 and 2004 being explained by growth rates of
the education variables between 1961 and 1975. Finally, for the "IV" Models 1 and 2, we instrument the 1961-95
period changes for the education variables using their beginning of period averages.